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Recently there has been a chorus of competition complaints 
asserting that Google's conduct and position today is parallel to 
Microsoft's position in the “Microsoft case,” the antitrust case 
brought by the Department of Justice in 1998. Any monopolization 
case against Google Search would have to be very different from 
the Microsoft browser case, because the cost for a user switching 
from Google Search is much lower than was the cost in the 1990s 
(or today) of switching away from the Microsoft operating system. 
It would likewise need to be different because Google has not 
attempted to manipulate the cost of a user switching away from 
Google Search, at least not to a significant degree.  Low switching 
costs should and likely will have important implications for 
antitrust analysis of Google.  
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Is Google the new Microsoft?  Many think that it is, and in 
particular there has been a chorus of competition complaints 
(ironically many originating from Microsoft) that assert that 
Google's conduct and position today is quite parallel to Microsoft's 
position in the “Microsoft case,” the case brought by the 
Department of Justice in 1998.
1
   
We contend in this article, however, that there is a central 
difference which should remain in constant focus in any antitrust 
analysis.  The cost of a user switching from Google Search to 
another search engine today is trivial compared to the cost of a user 
switching from Microsoft Windows to another operating system in 
1998.  Moreover, in the Microsoft case, the government's theory 
was that Microsoft was taking strategic actions to maintain high 
switching costs by maintaining an “applications barrier to entry.”2 
There is no parallel with Google, and the implication as we shall 
explain is that Google Search, if it poses any threat today, does not 
pose the same antitrust threat that Microsoft Windows posed in 
1998.  In this article, we explore the importance of high switching 
costs in the Microsoft case and in antitrust cases more generally, 
and  we explain the criticality of the absence of significant costs 
for users switching from Google Search.   
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently decided not 
to bring a monopolization case against Google Search after a 19-
month investigation.
3
  But this is by no means the end of the 
matter: the European Commission (EC) is “examining proposals 
put forward by Google to resolve complaints” and expects 
                                                 
1
 According to Gary Reback, for example, “[Google] is Microsoft redux . . . . [i]t 
is almost exactly the same case.” Don Clark & Ashby Jones, Google Probe Stirs 
Echoes of Microsoft Antitrust Case, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023042312045764041813138728
82.html. See also Bianca Bosker, Google Antitrust Inquiry: Microsoft’s History 
Looms Large, HUFFINGTON POST (June 23, 2011, 9:48 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/23/google-antitrust-inquiry-n_883389.  
html; Ian Paul, 10 Ways Google is the New Microsoft, PCWORLD (Feb. 10, 
2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/219384/10_ways_google_ 
is_the_new_microsoft.html; James Rowley, Antitrust Pick Varney Saw Google 
as Next Microsoft, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 17, 2009, 6:22 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aG9B5.J3Bl1w. 
2
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp. 2d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2000); see also 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
3
 Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition 
Concerns In the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, 
and in Online Search, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm. 
3
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resolution after the Commission’s summer break.4  The FTC 
decision notwithstanding, competitors continue to complain to 
antitrust authorities and urge them to investigate Google Search for 
anticompetitive conduct.
 5
  On January 30, 2013, the Initiative for a 
Competitive Online Marketplace (ICOMP), a coalition including 
Microsoft Corp., submitted a new dossier of allegations to the 
European Commission.
6 The most widely reported accusations 
against Google claim that it biases in favor of its own information 
or services in search results.
 7
  
Comparisons between antitrust complaints in the Microsoft 
case with current (so far non-litigated) complaints against Google 
Search ignore two fundamental differences related to the switching 
costs facing users of Microsoft Windows and Google Search. First, 
Microsoft has dominated operating systems for personal computers 
for nearly 30 years, mainly because switching costs for users and 
application developers were and are high—prohibitively high for 
many. In stark contrast, the costs of users switching among 
competing search engines is markedly lower, because every Web 
                                                 
4
 Foo Yun Chee, EU Sees Google Competition Deal After August, REUTERS 
(Feb. 22, 2012, 6:46 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/02/22/eu-google-
idINDEE91L07Y20130222.  
5
 See, e.g., Amir Efrati & Brent Kendall, Google Dodges Antitrust Hit, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 3, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323874204 
578219592520327884.html (“A Yelp spokesman said . . . that the probe's end 
‘represents a deeply disappointing missed opportunity to protect innovation in 
the Internet economy, and the consumers and businesses that rely upon it.’”).  
6
 Aoife White, Google Faces New EU Antitrust Complaint from Technology 




 See, e.g., Marvin Ammori & Luke Pelican, Why Search Bias Claims Against 
Google Don’t Hold Up, FORBES (June 7, 2012, 4:20 PM), http://www.forbes 
.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/06/07/why-search-bias-claims-against-google-dont-
hold-up/ (“At the heart of the antitrust scrutiny is Google’s competitors’ claim of 
‘search bias.’”);  Efrati & Kendall, supra note 5, (“TripAdvisor and Expedia 
referred to comments from FairSearch.org, a group that represented them and 
other companies opposed to Google.”); see also The Power of Google: Serving 
Consumers or Threatening Competition?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, 112th Cong. 35-36 (2011) 
(statement of Jeremy Stoppelman, Co-founder and Chief Executive Officer of 
Yelp, Inc.), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg71471/pdf/CHRG-
112shrg71471.pdf; Ian Paul, Google Faces Anti-Trust Accusers Expedia, 
Nextag, and Yelp Wednesday, PCWORLD, (Sept. 21, 2011, 9:31 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/240330/google_faces_anti_trust_accusers_expe
dia_nextag_and_yelp_wednesday.html; Danny Sullivan, Given Nextag’s Lack 
Of Transparency, Its WSJ Opinion Piece Asking For Google Transparency Isn’t 
Wise, SEARCHENGINELAND.COM (June 8, 2012, 1:41 PM), http://searchengine 
land.com/given-nextags-lack-of-transparency-its-wsj-opinion-piece-asking-for-
google-transparency-isnt-wise-124045; Shara Tibken, Yelp CEO: Yep, Google 
Can Be Pretty Evil, CNET (Nov. 27, 2012, 2:44 PM), http://news 
.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57555084-93/yelp-ceo-yep-google-can-be-pretty-evil. 
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browser is more or less equally compatible with competing search 
engines.
8
 Thus, Google was able to gain high market share at 
Yahoo’s expense with a negligible marketing budget because the 
cost of users switching from Yahoo search was relatively small and 




Second, Microsoft was not simply an innocent beneficiary 
of high switching costs: it made strategic choices
10
 to substantially 
increase switching costs in PC operating systems (Windows), 
productivity applications (such as Word, Excel, PowerPoint and 
Outlook), Internet browsers (Internet Explorer), and server 
operating systems (Exchange Server).  In contrast, it is easy for a 
user to switch away from Google Search, and Google has not acted 
strategically to substantially increase the inherently low switching 
costs across search engines. Irrespective of web browser, users can 
easily change their default search engine setting from one search 
engine to another, or easily use multiple search engines no matter 
what their default setting. This article addresses these differences 
in switching costs and the strategic use of switching costs to 
explain why Google is quite different from Microsoft from a 
competition policy perspective. 
The relative absence of switching costs  (both inherent and 
strategic) for Google’s search users means that Google is subject to 
market discipline if it provides a worse search experience than 
other search engines.  It provides a strong reason to think that the 
FTC acted rightly in deciding not to bring a case against Google.  
It also limits the short run and long run market power that Google 
has over its users and should provide caution for European antitrust 
                                                 
8
 Because the Web is an open system, there is no equivalent “applications barrier 
to entry” in search.  It is possible, though, that (1) an operating system could 
cause one search engine to perform better than another (e.g., Windows 8 
advantages Bing over Google) and/or (2) the operating system causes one 
browser to perform better than another (e.g., Microsoft designs Windows 8 to 
advantage Internet Explorer over Mozilla Firefox), which could in turn 
advantage its companion search engine (Internet Explorer & Bing). See, e.g., 
Loek Essers, Mozilla Hits Microsoft With Complaint About Windows RT 
Browser Choices, PCWORLD (May 10, 2012, 3:50 AM), http://www.pcworld 
.com/article/255365. 
9
 For a concise summary of the rise and fall of the leading search engines over 
the past 15 years, see Michael L. Katz, A Guide to Network Effects, Switching 
Costs, and Competition in Online Search (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). See also Aaron Wall, History of Search Engines: From 1945 to 
Google Today, SEARCH ENGINE HISTORY, http://www.searchenginehistory.com 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2013). 
10
 For a discussion of the strategic use of increased switching costs to gain 
competitive advantage, see MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: 
CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 286-88 (1985). 
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enforcers investigating Google, as well as a significant hurdle for 
private plaintiffs.   
Accusations that Google unfairly or unreasonably 
privileges its own information or services in results for users 
searching for stock data or weather information are very difficult 
for a court or regulator to usefully arbitrate.
11
  However, in the 
absence of switching costs, users can usually defend themselves in 
a free marketplace, and there are strong incentives to provide better 
results (as judged by users) than the next kid on the block.  In the 
absence of meaningful switching costs, there should be a high 
hurdle for those who claim consumer injury.  
In Section I, we summarize the economics of switching 
costs and distinguish the main types of switching costs, including: 
compatibility costs (and their relationship to network effects), 
contractual costs, transactions costs, search costs, learning costs, 
and shopping costs. We provide illustrations of each type of 
switching cost and explain the interdependencies across types. We 
also explain the fundamental difference between “inherent” 
switching costs, those that occur naturally in any given market, and 
“strategic” switching costs, which are created or elevated by a 
competitor (or group of competitors) to reduce the incidence of 
switching. 
In Section II, we show that high switching costs—both 
inherent and strategically created—were central to the 
government’s browser case against Microsoft.12 The high cost of 
buying a new computer (relative to a new operating system) was 
an important factor in the determination that the relevant market 
was Intel-compatible operating systems. Second, the “applications 
barrier to entry” (premised on the extremely high cost of switching 
to a different operating system) was central to finding that 
Microsoft had monopoly power. Microsoft’s efforts to increase 
already high switching costs were likewise central to the 
                                                 
11
 There are many complexities both of principle and of practice in arbitrating 
product decisions of this sort. Part of the problem is that it is not clear what a 
user wants from a search engine, apart from the revealed choices users make to 
use one engine instead of another. If Google puts weather data that it has 
purchased and packaged directly into a search result, this might be viewed by a 
user as a service, even if a competing weather service would prefer to have their 
own links there in place of the Google information.  Users’ views are bound to 
be heterogeneous, which compounds the difficulty of a court confidently 
predicting user views apart from their search engine choices. And, as to the 
ordering of links in Google search results, if a Google algorithm has selection 
criteria (other than hardcoding a Google site at the top) that result in high 
placement for a Google site, it will in most cases be difficult for a court to 
conclude that the criteria are unreasonable.  
12
 For a discussion of the economic issues raised in the United States’ case 
against Microsoft, see Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, An Economist’s 
Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (2001). 
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government’s case that Microsoft’s behavior was exclusionary. 
Microsoft’s exclusive deals with original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) to install Internet Explorer would have been ineffective 
had it not been difficult in the mid-1990s for people to download 
Netscape Navigator. Microsoft’s co-mingling of browser and 
operating system code was a strategic effort to increase switching 
costs, as were Microsoft’s deceptive statements to developers that 
its version of Java was fully compatible with Sun’s Java.13 
Section II also explains why the importance of switching 
costs in the Microsoft antitrust case is not anomalous. The effects 
of high switching costs have played a substantial role in other 
antitrust cases as well, even though courts have not always used 
the explicit language of switching costs. We briefly review several 
important instances in which switching costs were crucial to the 
competitive analysis and the litigation outcome, including the Intel 
case
14
 and the 1992 Kodak case.
15
 
In Section III, we compare and contrast the switching costs 
for Microsoft Windows users to those of users of Google Search 
and other generalized search engines.
16
 We review the evidence on 
switching costs in generalized search to show that switching costs 
are low—markedly lower than those found in PC operating 
systems and office applications. We also review the many 
alternatives to generalized search engines (GSEs), including 
vertical search engines (VSEs) and mobile applications, as well as 
toolbars, bookmarks, and other methods of facilitating direct 
access to Websites. 
We acknowledge that Google and other generalized search 
engines typically operate in a “two-sided market,” with users on 
one side and advertisers on the other. In almost all cases, search 
engine operators price their service at zero in the first market, and 
earn revenues from advertisers in the second. This article will not 
address switching costs in the advertising market. However, it is 
important to note that success on the advertising side of the market 
is dependent on success in attracting users and usage. If Google or 
any other GSE were to reduce the quality of their search results, 
they would also reduce the attractiveness of their site to 
advertisers.  The lower switching costs are for search users, the 
easier it is for users to switch search engines and more likely it is 
                                                 
13
 WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, 
HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 200 (2009). 
14
 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., No. 05-441 , 2008 WL 5377979 
(D. Del. Dec. 18, 2008). 
15
 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
16
 For arguments and evidence that switching costs in the online advertising 
market are low, see Katz, supra note 9; Geoffrey A. Manne, & Joshua D. 
Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case Against the Antitrust Case 
Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171 (2011).  
7
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that they will switch if they are dissatisfied with search results—
for whatever reason. 
Finally, we conclude that so long as users can easily switch 
from Google’s search engine—to other GSEs, VSEs, or search 
alternatives—Google, Inc. will only be successful to the extent that 
it continues to generate as good as or better search results for users 
than its competitors.  Because of low switching costs, Google 
search is vulnerable to existing competitors and new entrants to the 
market in a way that Microsoft’s operating system never was. We 
think this fundamental difference in switching costs is highly 
relevant to any antitrust analysis of Google and its position or 
conduct in the market—just as it was in government and private 
litigation against Microsoft, but with fundamentally different 
implications.   
I. THE ECONOMICS OF SWITCHING COSTS 
 
A. Switching Costs and Competitive Analysis 
 
Switching costs are those costs that are incurred when 
switching from one supplier of a particular good or service to 
another supplier, including money costs and the value of users’ 
time.
17
 Because switching costs sometimes inhibit consumers from 
switching from supplier A to supplier B, it is common for supplier 
B to implicitly or explicitly subsidize the cost of switching (e.g., by 
offering a substantial discount, or by providing free training to new 
users). “Lock-in” is defined as switching costs that are sufficiently 
high so that buyers stay with a current supplier rather than switch 
to a supplier whose product they consider to be preferable (or, 
alternatively, that the costs of switching suppliers exceed the 
benefits of switching).  
Inherent switching costs are those that arise from the nature 
of the product(s) or their market. Strategic switching costs reflect 
choices made by firms designed to create switching costs or 
increase them above their inherent level. The distinction between 
inherent and strategic switching costs is fundamentally important 
to antitrust analysis, particularly to a showing of monopolization or 
attempts to monopolize. 
Although some suppliers find it in their interest to increase 
switching costs, there can be consequences associated with such 
                                                 
17
  Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-in: Competition 
With Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORG. 
1967, 1971 (M. Armstrong & R. Porter eds., 2007). In many cases, the value of 
users’ time is the most important component of switching costs; for example, in 
installing a different PC operating system or converting from Microsoft Office 
to an online productivity suite. 
8
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activities, because consumers often prefer to buy products or 
services from suppliers where switching costs are low.
18
 
Alternatively, some suppliers pursue strategies, often through 
industry standards,
19
 that reduce switching costs to very low levels 
in order to expand the market by attracting customers with the 
knowledge that they can “mix-and-match” from various suppliers 
(a good example of which is audio-video systems).
20
 In these 
cases, firms are acting strategically to lower switching costs. 
There is one important point to note about switching costs: 
they are not static. An analysis of the competitive effects of 
switching costs in a given industry should consider how innovation 
in the industry—as well as the broader economic environment in 
which it operates—affects switching costs. One of the most 
important developments in the history of switching costs is the 
Internet and the emergence of online commerce, often in 
competition with “brick-and-mortar” in retailing21 or the traditional 
means of distributing media content.
22
 As we will note in 
discussing the various types of switching costs, the extraordinarily 
low costs of search on the Internet and the rise of online services 
have dramatically lowered search costs, shopping costs, and 
uncertainty costs. 
 
                                                 
18
 Many consumers are aware and take account of switching costs in their 
purchase decisions.  So, if suppliers act strategically to raise switching costs 
from their product to a competitor’s product, consumers may reduce or modify 
their purchase decisions to avoid those higher switching costs.  Thus, suppliers 
often face a tradeoff between raising switching costs to retain their current 
customers and lowering switching costs to attract new customers.  However, 
when there are powerful network externalities (e.g., a new user adopts Word or 
Excel because so many others already use them), this tradeoff is less likely to 
constrain efforts to raise switching costs. 
19
 For example, a number of companies cooperated to develop the Bluetooth 
wireless communications protocol, which enables users to mix and match 
equipment and switch from one supplier to another with very low switching 
costs. 
20
 For example, a Sony TV can easily be paired with a Toshiba DVD player, 
which can then be combined with a Bose speaker system. Such devices are 
designed to work together with few, if any, incompatibilities.  
21
 There is growing evidence that, due to the low cost of search and shopping on 
the Internet, retail stores often function as “showrooms” in which customers 
compare products, but then use mobile devices to compare prices and purchase 
online. For a discussion of this trend, see Laura Heller, Best Buy Wants You to 




 Contrast the high costs of switching between cable and satellite delivery of 
video programming versus the very low costs of using an existing broadband 
connection to switch among alternative sources of delivery of video 
programming via Internet streaming to PCs, TVs, or mobile devices (so-called 
“over-the-top” delivery). 
9
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B. Types of Switching Costs 
In each market, particular types of switching costs 
frequently play a prominent role, whereas other types usually do 
not. In some cases, switching costs are tangible and relatively easy 
to measure (if not precisely quantify). Other switching costs may 
be more intangible and more difficult to observe, but still play a 
significant role in consumer choice and competition in the market. 
Buyers and sellers, therefore, take steps to increase or decrease 
switching costs for competitive purposes. For example, in the face 
of high switching costs, sellers often use introductory pricing to 
attract new customers, effectively paying some or all of the costs 
of switching.
23
  Though there is no standardized categorization of 
switching costs, the following categories can be useful in analyzing 
the role of switching costs in market competition. 
COMPATIBILITY COSTS: When there are 
complementary products, purchase decisions about one product 
can “lock” a consumer into purchasing follow-on products—or at 
least create costs of switching to an alternate supplier. This 
situation can arise when consumers purchase durable products and 
consumable or replacement complements, such as razors and 
blades or computer printers and ink cartridges. Compatibility costs 
often play an important role in the computer industry, among 
hardware components (computer and printer), or between hardware 
and software. 
Compatibility costs are often interconnected with network 
effects, meaning that adoption of a product by additional users is 
complementary and, therefore, the benefits of adoption by any 
single user increases as other consumers adopt. According to 
Farrell and Klemperer: 
 
Switching costs and network effects bind customers 
to vendors if products are incompatible, locking 
customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-
in hinders customers from changing suppliers in 
response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in 
efﬁciency, and gives vendors lucrative ex post market 
power – over the same buyer in the case of switching 





Direct costs are incurred if consumers actually switch 
or actually adopt incompatible products. Consumers 
may avoid those costs by not switching, or by buying 
                                                 
23
 Farrell and Klemperer refer to this strategy as “bargain-then-ripoff” pricing. 
Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 17, at 1972. 
24
 Id. at 1970. 
10
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from the same ﬁrm, but that ties together transactions 
and thus often obstructs efﬁcient buyer–seller 
matching . . . . These entry hurdles may be broadly 
efﬁcient given incompatibility, but they nevertheless 




Thus, strategic choices of compatibility or incompatibility by early 
entrants can shape the development of the market and make it 
difficult for later entrants to choose a low switching cost approach.  
For example, the early strategic choices of Microsoft and Intel 
ensured the compatibility between MS-DOS (and its successor, 
Windows OS) and Intel’s x86 CPUs, but had the effect of making 
applications written for “Wintel” PCs incompatible with Apple’s 
OS or other operating systems.
26
  Such systems may be called 
“proprietary” or “closed.” For that reason, Klemperer argues that 
“[b]ecause switching costs very often make competition, and 
especially entry, less effective, I (and many others) favour 
cautiously pro-compatibility public policy. Policymakers should 
look particularly carefully at markets where incompatibility is 
strategically chosen rather than inevitable.”27 
The same logic applies to the enforcement of antitrust laws: 
firms that strategically use incompatibility to raise switching costs 
should be subject to heightened scrutiny. Alternatively, firms may 
choose to compete by creating an ecosystem of many compatible 
products, increasing total demand by facilitating mixing-and-
matching components or applications across a wide range of sellers 
(e.g., audio systems or the Web). Such systems may be called 
“open” or “non-proprietary.” Firms may develop industry 
standards to facilitate compatibility and interoperability (e.g., 
“http” and “html” were crucial to the development of the Internet; 




Firms may choose a set of strategies that combines both 
approaches. Apple, for example, has chosen to open the 
development of iPhone and iPad apps to independent, third-party 
developers. However, Apple has also chosen to close the 
                                                 
25
 Id. at 1972.  
26
 See MS-DOS, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MS-DOS (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2013) (describing history of MS-DOS). 
27
 Paul Klemperer, Switching Costs, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS (2008), http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008 
_S000460&edition=current&q=switching costs&topicid=&result_number=1. 
28
 The use of industry standards to promote competition while achieving 
interoperability (e.g., mobile communications) creates a substantial lock-in 
effect if patentees whose claims are standards-essential extract economic rents 
by committing patent hold-up. See Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting, 
Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L. J. 603 (2007). 
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distribution and sale of those apps to its App Store, and requires 
approval of the app prior to its sale. The net effect is that there are 
very high user switching costs from the Apple ecosystem to 
another ecosystem (e.g., Android), but very low/no switching costs 
within Apple’s ecosystem (e.g., one app to a similar app).29 
CONTRACTUAL COSTS: Suppliers often ﬁnd it 
advantageous to raise switching costs that might otherwise have 
been low. Likewise, consumers may accept high switching costs in 
return for “upfront consideration,” reduced uncertainty, or other 
benefits. To attract new or retain existing customers, and to 
upgrade their service plans, for example, most mobile carriers 
subsidize the price of a new smartphone in exchange for a term 
contract with penalties for early termination. Contracts can also be 
used to reward loyalty, as in frequent buying from a given vendor: 
a frequent flyer program is basically a contract between airline and 
consumer that provides travel awards and other benefits, 
depending on how many miles the consumer flies on the airline. 
Contracts can also reward large purchases or purchase 
commitments with price discounts. Exclusive provisions in 
contracts can effectively “lock-in” the customer to that supplier for 
the duration of the contract. Of course, in all these instances, 
knowing and willing buyers and sellers can realize “gains from 
trade” by making such commitments to each other. Problems arise, 
though, when a buyer feels that they have to accept terms from a 
supplier because they are dependent on that supplier in some way, 
such as depending on their services or products because of deep 
discounts. This possibility suggests the importance of examining 
the competitiveness of the market in which one observes these 
exclusive contracts or other contract provisions  that raise 
switching costs. 
TRANSACTIONS COSTS: Especially in the case of 
services that are provided on a continuing or subscription basis, 
customers often incur costs of switching to an alternative supplier. 
Switching financial service providers, such as checking accounts, 
credit cards, or investment management, often requires substantial 
time, effort, and expense. While many financial services providers 
attempt to make switching accounts easy, most consumers 
understand that it will be anything but. Recent developments in 
online financial services may have, in some cases, increased 
transaction switching costs. This is especially true if consumers 
have set default values in software that are connected to their 
current supplier (e.g., Quicken linked to Bank of America), 
registered credit cards for automatic payments or online purchases 
                                                 
29
 Some strategic choices may increase switching costs but have offsetting 
benefits to consumers (e.g., a higher degree of integration, interoperability and 
ease of use, as in Apple iPhone/iTunes). 
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(e.g., a Bank of America Visa card on an Amazon account), or 
programmed their checking account to auto-payments to other 
suppliers (e.g., using a Bank of America account to auto-pay 
monthly utility bills).  The value of users’ time required to change 
these settings and values would constitute a transaction cost of 
switching an electronic banking account from one financial 
institution to another. 
One important aspect of transaction switching costs is the 
element of risk. In deciding whether to switch financial 
institutions, for example, consumers recognize that, even if the 
benefits exceed the expected costs of switching, there is almost 
always a risk factor. That is, there is some probability that the 
actual costs will exceed the expected costs of switching, if, for 
example, mistakes are made in the switching process—whether by 
the consumer, the current supplier, or the new supplier. Often, 
consumers amplify such risks, in that their subjective perception of 
the risk is higher than an “objective” measurement of that risk. 
This is perhaps because such mistakes can be so exasperating when 
they occur. In any case, many consumers would admit to being 
dissatisfied with their current supplier, but do not switch because 
the risk-adjusted switching costs are too high. 
In software and online services, one important source of 
transactions costs is the difficulty of moving data or files from one 
supplier to another (e.g., contact information from one organizer to 
another or personalized information from one social network to 
another). Thus, the degree of “data portability” can be an important 
determinant of switching costs. Another significant potential 
source of transactions costs is the use of and degree of difficulty in 
setting or changing “defaults” (e.g., default browser, search engine, 
or media player).  
SEARCH COSTS: In the process of making a choice 
between continuing to purchase from his or her current supplier or 
switching to an alternative supplier, consumers must first know or 
find alternatives. In some cases, alternatives are reasonably well 
known through advertising or product placement and promotion. In 
other cases, though, consumers incur the costs of searching for 
alternatives. In the satisficing
30
 model of consumer choice, 
consumers often initiate search for alternatives because they are at 
least somewhat dissatisfied with their current product or supplier. 
Two of the most important roles of advertising are directly related 
                                                 
30
 Satisficing, a combination of “satisfying” and “sufficing”, refers to a model of 
decision-making that results in a choice that meets some acceptability 
requirements even if suboptimal. See generally JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT 
SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958); HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF THOUGHT (1979); 
HERBERT SIMON, Theories of Decision Making in Economics and Behavioral 
Science, 49 AMER. ECON. REV. 253 (1959).  
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to search costs. First, advertisers provide free information to 
potential consumers to reduce their search costs in case they are 
considering a switch. Second, advertisers attempt to persuade 
consumers that, whether or not they are dissatisfied with their 
current choice, there is a superior alternative available to them. 
Advertising is also used to convey that switching costs are low, or, 
in cases where there are significant non-search switching costs, 
that the advertiser will pay some or all of the switching costs.  
Whereas consumers incur transaction costs only if they 
make a switch, they incur search costs before they switch and, 
therefore, whether or not they ultimately switch. Thus, search costs 
can substantially affect other switching costs, because consumers 
conduct searches not merely to identify alternatives, but to obtain 
information about the costs and benefits of switching. For 
example, in deciding whether to change a mobile phone supplier, a 
customer can search for alternative carriers, the quality of service 
on that carrier’s network (reducing uncertainty costs), whether 
there are lower-priced plans and/or subsidized devices available, 
and whether there are promotional pricing plans available to cover 
some or all of the costs of switching from another carrier (e.g., a 
contract cancellation fee).  
LEARNING COSTS: Many goods are not merely 
“consumed”: they require consumers to actively participate in the 
use of the product in order to gain the benefits of the product. 
When a consumer uses a new type of product for the first time, 
they incur a learning cost, but it is not a switching cost. If products 
of a given type are similar in the way they operate and/or are 
operated (e.g., microwave ovens), there are little to no learning 
costs. The more significant the differences are across products, and 
the longer or more concentrated the effort required to learn how to 
use a different product, the greater the costs of switching between 
products. Computer operating systems and enterprise software are 
the prototypical products with high learning switching costs. Even 
if it were much easier to initially learn how to use software 
program A than program B, there could still be high learning costs 
associated with switching from B to A. 
UNCERTAINTY COSTS: When a consumer is purchasing 
from one supplier, she gains information about the benefits of 
using that supplier from experience. For products that are difficult 
to evaluate without such experience (hence the term “experience” 
goods), the differential between the experience a customer has had 
with the current supplier and the lack of experience with 
alternative suppliers can represent a switching cost. Additional 
uncertainty about the degree of risk in switching exacerbates these 
uncertainty costs:  
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Switching costs also reflect the business risk of 
changing vendors. Even if additional training and 
replication costs are minimal . . . uncertainty around 
how successfully a business will adapt to a new 
[enterprise software] package . . . can lead executives 
to be heavily biased towards an existing vendor. This 
bias is enhanced by “urban legends” of customers’ 





An increasingly important method of reducing uncertainty 
costs is the use of consumer ratings and reviews of products in 
services, made easily available via the Internet. Whereas 
advertising presents information from the supplier’s point of view, 
ratings and reviews offer information about the experience of other 
users, which in many cases may be more relevant and less biased 
than suppliers’ advertising. The benefits of sharing experience are 
heightened when consumers have reasons to trust the raters (e.g., 
Facebook friends) or the ratings (e.g., collaborative filtering on 
Amazon, Netflix, and others). Thus, the “pooling of experience” 
among users can reduce uncertainty costs to the point at which 
consumers are willing to switch (assuming other switching costs 
are not so high as to prevent it). 
If there are no or low switching costs of other types, 
uncertainty costs are not important: the consumer can try the 
product of one supplier, then try another and another, and finally 
choose the product that best suits his or her preferences. However, 
when other switching costs are high, uncertainty costs can amplify 
those switching costs. A prominent example of this effect 
generates the “fatalism effect”: because consumers are uncertain 
about whether the services of another financial services provider 
are better than their current supplier, the high transactions cost of 
making a change prevents them from trying the other supplier to 
find out. This compounded effect of high transaction and 
uncertainty switching cost effects mean consumers may not switch 
even when they are very dissatisfied with their current supplier. 
SHOPPING COSTS: Even when consumers know which 
product they will buy, there are costs related to the buying process 
- namely, shopping for the products. Whereas compatibility and 
transaction switching costs cause consumers to buy different, 
complementary products from the same supplier over time, the 
existence of shops offering a broad portfolio of brands helps 
                                                 
31
 Ian Larkin, Bargains-Then-Ripoffs: Innovation, Pricing and Lock-In in 
Enterprise Software, 2008 ACAD. OF MGMT. ANN. MEETING PROCEEDING 1, 7 
(Aug. 1, 2008). 
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consumers save transaction costs, or “shopping costs.” The 
switching cost examples mentioned above involved repeat 
purchases of the same product from the same supplier over time. 
Instead, shopping costs create incentives to purchase different 
products from the same supplier at the same point in time. 
Some businesses are based on the principle of reducing 
search and shopping costs.  For example, supermarkets offer a 
broad range of products to reduce the costs of shopping at multiple 
stores with narrow product lines (e.g., a butcher shop, a fruits and 
vegetables store, a bakery).  Shopping malls offer an aggregation 
of many specialty stores, but closely situated for ease of access, 
making it easier for shoppers to identify and compare alternatives 
before making purchase decisions. In other lines of business, one 
observes the “Hotelling effect”32 in independent locational 
decisions by suppliers, which also have the effect of reducing 
search and shopping costs (e.g., auto rows, or collections of 
specialty food stores).  
Having described the types of switching costs, we now turn 
to a discussion of their relevance to the Microsoft browser case and 
other antitrust cases. 
II. THE CENTRALITY OF HIGH SWITCHING COSTS, INHERENT AND 
STRATEGIC, TO THE MICROSOFT BROWSER CASE AND OTHER 
ANTITRUST CASES 
Microsoft has dominated personal computer operating 
systems for over three decades. This feat is partly explained by the 
quality of Microsoft's products, which have continuously improved 
during that time. It is also explained by the sizable switching costs 
that users incur if they switch to another operating system. These 
switching costs played a central role in the United States 
government's monopolization case against Microsoft, though the 
term “switching costs” was rarely used explicitly.33 
Microsoft has been protected from competition by at least 
three of the types of switching costs discussed above: compatibility 
costs, transaction costs, and learning costs. Compatibility costs 
played a particularly central role in Microsoft. In particular, users 
                                                 
32
 Named for the economist Harold Hotelling, the Hotelling effect explains why 
businesses selling relatively homogeneous goods have an incentive to locate 
themselves almost adjacent to each other to prevent the other firms from 
claiming a larger share of the market.  See Harold Hotelling, Stability in 
Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41, 41–57 (1929). 
33
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Switching 
costs also played an important role in the European Commission’s case against 
Microsoft. Its 2004 order found that Microsoft had vertically leveraged control 
from its operating system to media viewers and interface standards between PCs 
and servers. See Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 17, at 2011. 
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of Microsoft Windows enjoyed its compatibility with a vast array 
of applications designed specifically to work with Windows. 
Because these Windows applications would not work with other 
operating systems (unless the applications were rewritten for 
them), users who switched from the Windows operating system 
suffered a large compatibility switching cost. What the Department 
of Justice (DOJ), the district court, and the D.C. Circuit came to 
call “the applications barrier to entry” expresses the idea that it is 
difficult for a rival operating system to attract users when users 




As we explain below, switching costs played a central role 
in the market definition in Microsoft. Switching costs were also 
instrumental to the DOJ’s proof that Microsoft had monopoly 





A. Switching Costs were Key to the Government Showing 
that Microsoft had Monopoly Power 
 
The DOJ successfully proved in Microsoft that the relevant 
market was Intel-compatible PC operating systems. The district 
court and D.C. Circuit viewed the Macintosh operating system 
(Mac OS) as outside of the market because  
][C[ustomers would not switch from Windows to a 
Mac OS in response to a substantial price increase 
because of the costs of acquiring the new hardware 
needed to run Mac OS (an Apple computer and 
peripherals) and compatible software applications, as 
well as because of the effort involved to learning the 
new system and transferring files to its format.
36
  
These formidable switching costs could easily tally several 
thousand dollars even for customers with a modest cost of time, so 
it is understandable that the district court and D.C. Circuit 
excluded the Mac operating system from the relevant market 
definition.  
After defining the market, the DOJ needed to prove 
Microsoft's monopoly power and, as one would expect, switching 
costs again played a starring role. Microsoft's share of Intel-
compatible operating systems exceeded 95%, but a high share does 
                                                 
34
 See, e.g., Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 55; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 
F.Supp.2d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2000). 
35
 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 60. 
36
 Id. at 52. 
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not alone prove that a firm has monopoly power. If entry is 
sufficiently easy and switching costs are low, the threat of entry 
can constrain a firm's prices to competitive levels. Switching costs 
were the cornerstone of the DOJ’s case: the government argued 
that the applications barrier to entry—an important form of 
compatibility switching cost—was substantial and gave Microsoft 
its monopoly power.  
Let us consider the relationship between the applications 
barrier to entry and switching costs. With Windows, consumers 
had access to more than 70,000 applications.
37
 Most of these 
applications were not available on other operating systems because 
porting (i.e., “switching”) them to other systems was too costly. 
Moreover, while Microsoft was correct to point out that a user only 
wants a small fraction of these applications and might be entirely 
satisfied by those on a rival operating system like Mac OS, the user 
will find it costly to switch operating systems later when a new 
need emerges. Accordingly, investing in a rival operating system 
with a thinner pool of applications is risky and potentially costly.  
 
B. Microsoft Acted Anticompetitively to Increase, 
Maintain, and Exploit High Switching Costs  
As we have seen, the Microsoft operating system monopoly 
was protected by an applications barrier to entry. From the 
consumer perspective, this barrier represented a cost to users who 
switched away from Windows. From the perspective of an 
applications developer, it resulted from the high cost of porting 
Windows code to non-Windows operating systems.  Microsoft was 
naturally concerned about anything that would—or had the 
potential to—erode an application’s barrier to entry. That is exactly 
what the non-Microsoft browser Netscape threatened to do. 
Cloud computing was in its infancy in the 1990s. Still, 
Netscape’s threat to Microsoft's operating system monopoly was 
apparent. Netscape exposed application program interfaces 
(APIs)
38
 that allowed software on distant servers to compute and 
communicate results in useful ways with a user's personal 
computer. Many of these APIs were part of the Java virtual 
machine (JVM)
39
 that came with every installation of Netscape. 
                                                 
37
 Id. at 56. 
38
 An API is a protocol or library that includes the structure and details used to 
operate a piece of software or coding language. 
39
 JVM is a Sun Microsystems program designed to execute other programs 
composed in Java bytecode.  
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Sun's slogan for Java was “Write Once, Run Everywhere.” 40 Sun's 
idea was that the JVM (like the Navigator APIs) would be the 
same across different operating systems so that a program written 
to call Java's APIs could be used on any system with low or no 
switching costs. Because Netscape and the JVM were being made 
available across most operating systems—not just Windows—they 
had the potential to commoditize the operating system if a 
sufficient mass of useful programs were written to use the 
Netscape or JVM APIs.    
Netscape thus threatened to erode (or in Sun's dreams and 
Microsoft's nightmares, obliterate) the applications barrier to entry, 
opening all operating systems to compete on their intrinsic merits 
as opposed to the merits derived from the array of programs 
written for them. Moreover, if Java and Netscape-based 
applications worked across operating systems, users would not 
become locked into Microsoft's operating system by learning 
applications unavailable elsewhere or by investing in non-portable 
data. Since Microsoft in many ways created and exploited the 
switching costs inherent in the applications barrier to entry, it 
could not afford to risk Netscape becoming ubiquitous. Paul 
Maritz, a Microsoft executive, said that Internet Explorer would 
allow Microsoft to “cut off Netscape’s air supply.”41  
To be brief, the problem from Microsoft's vantage was that 
Netscape Navigator and the Java virtual machine that came with it 
threatened to lower switching costs for consumers who changed 
operating systems. Netscape Navigator and Java were written for 
multiple operating systems, and if they became sufficiently 
popular, then “developers could rely upon the APIs exposed by 
such middleware” to cheaply port programs to other operating 
systems.
42
  Microsoft's basic strategy was to make sure that as 
many users as possible received Microsoft's browser, Internet 
Explorer (IE), as their default browser and to make switching away 
from IE as difficult as possible. This would maintain the 
incompatibility of applications (and Microsoft's application 
advantage) so that it would be costly for users to switch away from 
Windows.  
Microsoft orchestrated a thorough campaign intended to 
promote Internet Explorer and limit Netscape’s market penetration. 
It did so by strategically raising contractual, transactional, and 
                                                 
40
 For a discussion of “Write Once, Run Anywhere,” see Nick Langley, Write 
Once, Run Anywhere?, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (May 2002), http://www. 
computerweekly.com/feature/Write-once-run-anywhere.  
41
 Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Findings of Fact at 91.3.1, United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232). 
42
  PHILIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS ¶ 
403 (7th ed. 2013) (forthcoming August 2013). 
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uncertainty switching costs. It started by signing up deals with 
computer manufacturers (OEMs), Internet service providers, and 
Apple to install IE and not Netscape. Later, Microsoft decided to 
“weld IE to Windows,” intermingling browser and operating 
system code, and not allowing the “Add/Remove program” utility 
to uninstall IE.
43
 Finally, Microsoft “took steps 'to maximize the 
difficulty with which applications written in Java could be ported 
from Windows to other platforms, and vice versa.'“44 In some 
internal documents Microsoft called the incompatible version of 
Java it developed “polluted” Java and at least one Microsoft 
document stated as a strategic goal:  “Kill cross-platform Java by 
grow[ing] the polluted Java market.”45 At the same time, Microsoft 
deceived developers, leading them to believe that its “polluted” 




Overall, Microsoft's browser wars were an effort to 
maintain high switching costs among operating systems by 
maintaining the applications barrier to entry. Switching costs also 
played an important role in the means Microsoft chose to achieve 
this end, as Microsoft made it difficult and costly to switch to 
Netscape from Internet Explorer by designing “Windows 98, 'so 
that using [Netscape] on Windows 98 would have unpleasant 
consequences for users'“47 and by excluding Netscape from the 
cheapest and easiest distribution channels such as major Internet 
service providers (like AOL) and computer manufacturers (like 
Dell), so that users in many cases needed to download Netscape 




C. Role of Switching Costs Elsewhere in Antitrust Case 
Law 
The central role of switching costs in the Microsoft 
antitrust case is no anomaly. Antitrust cases often revolve around 
switching costs (even when the term “switching costs” is not 
explicit in court opinions). One reason is that high switching costs 
may lead to a narrow market definition and a finding of high 
defendant market shares. Switching costs also lead to barriers to 
entry and barriers to expansion for rivals. The combination of high 
defendant market share and rivals suffering from barriers to entry 
                                                 
43
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
44
 Id. at 74.  
45
 Id. at 76-77. 
46
 Id. at 76.  
47
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F.Supp.2d 9, 52 (D.D.C 1999)).  
48
 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F.Supp.2d 9, 47, 60 (D.D.C 1999).  
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and expansion will frequently lead to a finding of market power. 
Finally, the alleged exclusionary conduct in an antitrust case often 
involves efforts to strategically raise switching costs.
49
 On the 
other hand, an absence of switching costs provides an antitrust 
defendant with strong arguments that consumers will not suffer a 
price increase above competitive levels, and that entrants with 
superior offerings will attract customers. 
1. Role of Switching Costs in Narrowing Market 
Definition 
A variety of aftermarket cases have used switching costs to 
justify narrow one-brand markets.
50
 The first such case was 
Kodak.
51
 In Kodak, there was ample competition among different 
brands of photocopiers, but independent service organization 
plaintiffs who serviced Kodak equipment successfully alleged that 
parts and services for Kodak copiers was a relevant product 
market. The key to the case was that once the customers purchased 
or leased long-term a Kodak machine, there was a high transaction 
cost of switching away from Kodak, because a customer would 
need to take a significant loss to sell the Kodak machine (or cancel 
the lease) and buy or lease another brand.
52
 Moreover, because 
Kodak had changed policies midstream and stopped supplying 
parts to independent service operators, even intense ex-ante 
competition at the time of the photocopier sale would not 
necessarily have ameliorated all potential problems.
53
  
Other aftermarket cases that have followed in the wake of 
Kodak and used switching costs to define narrow markets include 
Newcal Industries v. Ikon and In re Apple & AT & TM. In Newcal, 
the cost of breaching a long-term equipment lease was a 
sufficiently high switching cost to justify a narrow market 
definition.
54
 With Apple & AT&T, the switching cost was the 
sizable cost of buying a new phone if a customer wanted to leave 




                                                 
49
 See Farrell & Klemperer, supra note 17, at 1976. 
50
 Aftermarkets are markets for parts and services that go with a durable good.  
Thus the toner market is an aftermarket for printers; auto repair is an aftermarket 
for automobiles.   
51
 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
52
 Id.at 462-80.  
53
 The other reason that ex-ante competition might not ameliorate problems was 
the possibility that too few customers would engage in life-cycle pricing.  
54
 Newcal Indus., Inc. v. IKON Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).  
55
 In re Apple & AT & TM Antitrust Litigation, 596 F.Supp.2d 1288 (N.D. Cal. 
2008). 
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2. Role of Switching Costs in Assessing Market Power 
In all of the above cases, as in Microsoft, the presence of 
high switching costs led courts to define a market narrowly. If a 
market is sufficiently narrow then a defendant will tend to have a 
high market share, which can be used to justify an inference of 
market power.  
Of course, high market share does not necessarily imply 
market power. If expansion of the remaining suppliers or new 
entry is easy, then even a firm with high market share may have 
limited power to raise prices. Here again, switching costs play an 
important role. High switching costs will limit new entry and 
impede the expansion of rivals, so that a firm with high market 
share can profitably raise prices. High switching costs thus make 
the connection between high market share and market power more 
convincing. In the Microsoft case, the high switching costs of 
porting applications or data created the entry barriers, which were 
critical in proving Microsoft's monopoly power.  
3. Role of Switching Costs in Exclusionary Conduct 
Switching costs were also critical to proving 
anticompetitive conduct by Microsoft. In particular, Microsoft's 
efforts to strategically raise switching costs became the foundation 
of the government’s monopolization claim.  This role of switching 
costs was also not unique to Microsoft. The importance of 
strategically imposed switching costs in antitrust is at least as old 
as United Shoe.
56
 Judge Wyzanski found that United, instead of 
competing on merits, chose contractual lease terms that “created 
barriers to entry by competitors.” These barriers can largely be 
understood as creating high contractual switching costs. In Judge 
Wyzanski’s words:  
 
[T]he complex of obligations and rights accruing 
under United’s leasing system in operation deter a 
shoe manufacturer from disposing of a United 
machine and acquiring a competitor’s machine. He is 
deterred more than if he owned that same United 
machine, or if he held it on a short lease carrying 
simple rental provisions and a reasonable charge for 
cancelation before the end of the term. The lessee is 
now held closely to United by the combined effect of 
the 10 year term, the requirement that if he has work 
available he must use the machine to full capacity 
                                                 
56
 United States v. United Shoe Machinery, 110 F.Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), 
aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
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and by the return charge which can in practice . . . be 
reduced to insignificance if he keeps this and other 





Another string of recent “switching cost” cases involve 







) without would-be 
infringers knowing about the patent or falsely claiming that the 
patent would be licensed under fair reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory (“FRAND”) terms. The potential problem in 
these cases is that the plaintiff can postpone negotiation over 
license fees until a time when the costs of switching to a rival 
technology are prohibitively high (hence the term “patent 
ambush”). Thus, for example, after receiving a patent in 1991 on a 
“mechanical slot configuration used on the motherboard to receive 
the VL-bus card,” Dell joined the Video Electronics Standards 
Association (“VESA”).61 Dell representatives were members of 
VESA's Local Bus Committee, which approved the VL-bus design 
standard. Dell represented that the VL-bus proposal did not 
infringe any Dell patents, but after adoption of the standard was 
widespread, attempted to enforce its patent rights.
62
  
There are a couple of types of switching costs relevant to 
these patent ambush cases. The first is a transaction cost - namely, 
the cost of organizing industry players to create a standard that 
does not rely on the patents at issue. If it were trivial to redo the 
standard and exclude the patent in question, then the patent holder 
could not extract unreasonably high prices even after inclusion in 
the standard. Standard setting, however, is an involved and time-
consuming practice, and standards, once set, are not easily redone, 
not only because it can take years of meetings to select a standard, 
but also because a variety of firms invest in producing products 
compatible with the standard.
63
  
                                                 
57
 Id. at 340. 
58
 Consent Order, Etc., in Regard to Alleged Violation of Sec. 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616 (1996) (No. 
C-3658), 1996 WL 33412055   [hereinafter Dell Consent Order]. 
59
 Order Denying Motion for Stay, In re Rambus, Inc., (No. 9302), 2002 WL 
1729621 (2002). 
60
 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007). 
61Dell Computer Settles FTC Charges; Won’t Enforce Patent Rights For Widely 
Used Computer Feature, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 2, 1995), http://www.ftc 
.gov/opa/1995/11/dell.shtm. 
62
 Dell Consent Order, supra note 58, at 617. 
63
 For more discussion of these patent ambush cases, see AREEDA, KAPLOW & 
EDLIN, supra note 42, at ¶ 340.  
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A second type of switching cost (which is a reason that 
standards are sticky) is the fact that many firms will frequently 
make irreversible investments in designing products that are 
compatible and complementary with the patented technology once 
it is part of a standard.
64
 The point of having standards, after all, is 
exactly this sort of coordination (electrical plugs fitting in outlets, 
for example). Because these switching costs are large, antitrust 
courts have a significant interest in making sure that 
anticompetitive conduct does not allow firms to attain and exercise 
market power through standard setting.  
A final line of cases involving switching costs concerns 





 Loyalty pricing arrangements can be understood 
as the strategic creation of, or increase in, contractual switching 
costs. Both 3M and Intel sold a line of products and gave a 
discount across the whole line if purchasing targets were achieved 
by a purchaser. The court in 3M quotes the Areeda and 
Hovenkamp treatise to the effect that “the defendant rewards the 
customer for [continuing to buy] its product B rather than the 
plaintiff’s B, not because defendant’s B is better or even cheaper, 
but because the customer does not want to lose a discount on A, 
which the plaintiff does not produce.”67  The lost discount on A is 
a cost of switching from defendant's B to plaintiff's B.  Whether 
and when the imposition of such a switching cost is 
anticompetitive is of course a subject of controversy,
68
 but the 
fundamental antitrust complaint can be seen as an allegation that 
strategically created switching costs prevents rivals from entering 
or expanding.    
III. A COMPARISON OF SWITCHING COSTS: MICROSOFT 
WINDOWS VS. GOOGLE SEARCH 
The basic premises of this article are that (1) the analysis of 
switching costs are critical to antitrust policy and enforcement and 
(2) the enormous difference in switching costs between Microsoft 
Windows (high) and Google Search (low) is fundamental to any 
comparison of the two companies with respect to claims of 
monopolization or attempts to monopolize. In this section, we first 
compare the switching costs of Microsoft and Google by each 
                                                 
64
 Farrell et al., supra note 28, at  607-09. 
65
 LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2003). 
66
 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., No. 05-441, 2008 WL 5377979 
(D. Del. Dec. 18, 2008). 
67
 LePage's Inc., 324 F.3d at 155  (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 794, at 83 (2002 Supp.)).   
68
 See Jonathon M. Jacobson, A Note on Loyalty Discounts, THE ANTITRUST 
SOURCE , June 2010, at 1-10.  
24
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 15 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol15/iss2/4
THE ROLE OF SWITCHING COSTS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:  
A COMPARISON OF MICROSOFT AND GOOGLE 
193 
 
type. We also present a brief review of empirical evidence and 
studies regarding the switching costs of search—first among 
generalized search engines, then between generalized search and 
vertical search, and finally among other means of finding 
information on the Internet, which in our framework are all 
competitive constraints on generalized search engines. 
 
A. Comparison by Types of Switching Costs 
Compatibility Costs: The substantial differences in 
switching costs between Microsoft Windows and Google Search 
arise from a fundamental difference: whereas the Windows 
operating system is a proprietary platform, Google Search runs on 
an open platform—the Internet. A personal computer (or mobile 
device) typically runs a single operating system that is compatible 
with the CPU; in turn the operating system can run many different 
applications, so long as they are compatible with the operating 
system.
69
 Thus, the fact that applications are compatible with 
Windows but incompatible with other operating systems such as 
Linux or Mac OS creates very large switching costs.
70
  So high are 
those switching costs that most users are reluctant to switch to an 
alternative operating system,
71
 at least until they decide to buy a 
new computer.
72 
This fact was even more true at the time of the 
Microsoft browser case, when Linux was in its infancy and cloud 
computing did not yet exist.    
Google Search—and other forms of Internet search and 
discovery—run on the open Internet platform, i.e. the World Wide 
Web.  Typically, Google and other generalized search engines 
                                                 
69
 There are limited instances in which a computer can be partitioned to run two 
different operating systems (e.g., a Mac can run Mac OS and Windows), but 
most users do not have the technical sophistication to do so and, in this case, 
there is the additional expense of purchasing two operating systems.  
70
 If Microsoft had instead promoted an open system that allowed for cross-
platform compatibility, it is highly likely that these competing operating systems 
would have been much more successful in gaining market share.  In other 
words, Windows is not a “natural monopoly.”  
71
 Jung Suk Hyun & Jae H. Pae, The Role of Switching Costs in Technology 
Commitment: the Case of High Technology Market, 6 ASIA PAC. ADVANCES IN 
CONSUMER RES. 303 (2005); Seung-Hyun Hong & Leonardo Rezende, Network 
Effects, Switching Costs, and Underlying Preferences in Operating Systems for 
Servers: A Case of Linux vs. Windows (Networks, Elec. Commerce, and 
Telecomm. Inst.. Working Paper No. 06-12, 2006). 
72
 Because of incompatibility of applications across platforms, we typically 
observe “uni-homing” in computer operating systems, at least on any given 
device.  Of course many users have multiple devices, each with a different 
operating system (e.g., a Windows PC, an iOS iPhone, and an Android tablet).  
It is rare, though, for users to change the operating system on any given device; 
indeed, in many cases it would be very difficult or impossible to do so. 
25
Edlin and Harris: THE ROLE OF SWITCHING COSTS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
THE ROLE OF SWITCHING COSTS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:  
A COMPARISON OF MICROSOFT AND GOOGLE 
194 
 
attract users by offering free search services (“native” or “organic” 
search results) and charge advertisers whenever users click-
through on “sponsored” search results.73 However, in contrast to 
Windows, any computer or mobile device using any operating 
system and any Web browser can reach any search engine once the 
computer is connected to the Web. Thus, for the user side of 
search, the Web is the platform: an open system that promotes 
interconnectivity and interoperability through a set of industry 
standards, such as hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) and 
hypertext markup language (HTML). The Web is the ultimate 
compatibility platform; indeed, the extraordinarily high level of 




Thus, while any given user typically has one and only one 
operating system per computer, any user can access an unlimited 
number of websites and can reach those websites through an 
unlimited number of paths by searching on a generalized or 
specialized search engine, by entering a Web address manually, or 
by clicking on a bookmark or a link from another website or an 
email.  The more actively a consumer uses the Internet, the more 
likely they are to have learned the many different means of getting 
the information they seek and getting where they want to go on the 
Internet. 
Contractual Costs: When a user purchases an operating 
system, they are effectively entering into a contract for the right to 
use that operating system (as embodied in a license agreement). 
Typically, consumers buy an operating system that is pre-installed 
on the computer they are purchasing. Microsoft enters into 
contracts with computer OEMs to pre-install Windows and 
Windows applications (e.g., Office, Internet Explorer) on the 
machines they sell. As noted in Section C, Microsoft used those 
contracts to disadvantage or exclude competitors of applications 
(such as the Netscape Navigator browser). Once a user has a 
computer with pre-installed Windows/Office, he or she can buy 
upgraded versions of those programs at prices that are discounted 
from the prices a new user would pay. 
While OEMs may also have contracts to set Bing or Google 
as the default search engine on a computer or smartphone,
75
 
                                                 
73
 See Advertise Your Business on Google, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ 
ads/adwords2/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2013) for an overview of Google’s AdWords 
search advertising service. 
74
 Because the Web is an open system, we typically observe “multi-homing” in 
search, as consumers use a number of different search methods, including one or 
more generalized search engines, vertical search engines, mobile applications, 
and others. 
75
 For an overview of the discussion to switch the default search engine from 
Google to Bing on Apple’s mobile devices, see Ian Paul, Bing to Become the 
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changing the default setting to a different search engine requires 
only a few simple steps.
76
  For that reason, default search engine 
contracts with OEMs do not generate significant switching costs.  
In contrast, Microsoft’s Windows/Office contracts with OEMs 
generated substantial switching costs because of the difficulty and 
complexity of changing the operating system on a personal 
computer. Moreover, the use of a search engine requires no license 
agreement between the user and the supplier. Just as there is no 
need to buy the right to use a search engine, there is no need to buy 
upgrades. Rather, search engines are continuously upgraded and 
improved, at no cost to users.  
 Transaction Costs: If a user were to switch from Windows 
to a different operating system, she would also have to replace 
most or all of her applications programs, since Office and other 
Windows-compatible programs are not compatible with other 
operating systems. Likewise, in many cases, documents, files, or 
content created with Windows applications would at minimum 
need to be converted to different formats to be useable with those 
newly purchased applications. In the worst cases, the formats are 
not only incompatible: there are no practical means of converting 
them. For these reasons, the transactions costs of switching away 
from Windows/Office are extraordinarily high, which is why many 
of us continue to use Windows/Office.  
It should be noted, though, that these transaction costs may 
be lowered by technological change, as competition for the market 
provides incentive for sellers to reduce the switching costs of 
proprietary systems and/or offer a competing open system. 
Likewise, Cloud-based Google Docs is becoming a significant 
competitor to Microsoft Office.
77
  
                                                                                                             
iPhone's Default Search Engine?, PCWORLD (Jan. 20, 2010, 5:25 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/187261/bing_to_become_the_iphones_default_
search_engine.html. Similarly, HP reached a deal with Microsoft to set Bing as 
the default search engine on HP devices. Nathania Johnson, Bing to Be the 




 Changing the default search engine is a straightforward process on Android 
devices and other similar devices.  The steps required on an AT&T Samsung 
Galaxy Note, for example, are as follows: 1) open web browser, 2) go to the 
browser’s “Settings,” 3) scroll through the list to “Select Search Engine,” and 4) 
choose from available options.  Zedomax, How to Change Default Search 
Engine on Android Browser! - [AndroidDummies], YOUTUBE (Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4SF1Q8YSspU. 
77
 See Brandon Widder, Best Free Microsoft Office Alternatives, DIGITAL 
TRENDS (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/best-
microsoft-office-alternatives/ (stating that several free open-source products are 
challenging Microsoft’s dominance of office software, including Google Docs). 
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Across search engines, there are virtually zero transactions 
switching costs. As we will detail in the next sub-section, users not 
only frequently switch search engines between search sessions, 
they often switch during a search session. And switching is bi-
directional: it is as costless to switch from Google to Bing as it is 
from Bing to Google. Likewise, users can easily change default 
settings for search, and just as easily change them back again. To 
coin a term, “switch-back costs” are low. In contrast, the high 
transactions costs of switching back to Windows/Office, after 
switching to Mac OS, would essentially be the same, which 
amplifies the effects of learning (or “re-learning” after not using an 
operating system for some time and returning to it only to find that 
the latest version has changed) and uncertainty costs in making the 
decision to switch in the first place. 
Search Costs: Switching from one computer operating 
system to another—e.g. from Windows to Linux—first requires 
searching for alternative operating systems that are compatible 
with the hardware at hand.  Additionally, switching from one OS 
to another requires switching applications programs and/or files 
that were created with those programs.  Thus, there are substantial 
search costs for users to identify alternative operating systems and 
determine whether their current applications programs and files 
will be compatible with an alternate operating system.  In contrast, 
there are minimal, if any, search costs for finding other search 
engines, partly because consumers can use a search engine to 
search for alternatives.
78
 Indeed, even when users are not explicitly 
looking for other search engines, their search engines often return 
links to other search engine results.
79
 If the user finds those other 
search engines helpful, it is a simple matter to bookmark them or 
install an app for direct access in future uses. 
Learning Costs: Due to substantial differences in user 
interfaces, instruction sets, and capabilities of operating systems 
and application programs, there are substantial learning costs 
associated with switching from Windows/Office to competing 
systems. Moreover, the longer someone has used Windows/Office, 
the higher those learning costs become. Users are well aware of 
these learning costs, which therefore represent a very high hurdle 
to switching.  Indeed, there are high learning costs of switching 
                                                 
78
 For example, a Bing search on “search engine” returns many results, including 
individual search engines and guides to or reviews of search engines. A Query 
for Search Engine, BING, http://www.bing.com (search for “search engine”) (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2013). 
79
 For example, a Google search on “restaurants Berkeley” generates many 
individual restaurants, e.g., Chez Panisse, but two of the first native results are 
the vertical search engines Urbanspoon and Yelp. A Query for Berkeley 
Restaurants, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (search for “restaurants 
Berkeley”) (last visited Apr. 1, 2013). 
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from the Windows version of Office products to the Mac OS 
version, due to dramatic differences in user interfaces, toolbars, 
and command structure. 
In contrast, there are little or no learning costs associated 
with the use of search engines, general or vertical. While there are 
many slight differences in user interface or presentation of results, 
most users can begin using a new or different search engine almost 
immediately: as there is no learning curve, there are no switching 
costs. 
Uncertainty Costs: There are several different uncertainty 
costs associated with switching from Windows/Office. Included 
among these are not knowing whether or not applications will be 
available for the alternate operating system; whether files will be 
convertible into a format that is compatible with the new 
applications; and, not least, whether—once the user has learned 
how to use the new operating system and applications—she will 
actually find it preferable to Windows/Office. Many of these costs 
are inherent switching costs, but some may be strategic. 
Competitors have frequently complained of Microsoft’s efforts to 
increase uncertainty switching costs by spreading fear, uncertainty, 
and doubt (“FUD”) about competitors’ products.80 
By comparison, there are low uncertainty costs of 
switching search engines. As the evidence will show, users do care 
about the quality of results they obtain. Therefore, uncertainty 
about whether an alternative search engine may or may not present 
better results could represent a switching cost. However, given 
how low all of the other types of switching costs are, it is very easy 
for users to try an alternative engine to see whether it produces the 
desired results (which, needless to say, vary significantly from user 
to user). A user can simply open two browser windows or tabs to 
compare search results side-by-side in different search engines.
81
  
Indeed, Microsoft is currently running a “Bing It On” challenge, 
                                                 
80
 For an overview of FUD related to Microsoft, see Eric S. Raymond, Why 
Microsoft Smears—and Fears—Open Source, IEEE SPECTRUM 14 (Aug. 2001); 
and Nicholas Petreley, The Microsoft FUD Campaign vs. the Customer, LINUX 
J. (May 16, 2007), http://www.linuxjournal.com/content/microsoft-fud-
campaign-vs-customer. For a more recent FUD case involving Apple and 
iPhone “jailbreaking,” see David Kravets, iPhone Jailbreaking Could Crash 
Cellphone Towers, Apple Claims, WIRED (July 28, 2009, 4:18 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/07/jailbreak. 
81
 Indeed, using Blekko, users can compare search results of Blekko, Bing, and 
Google in three side-by-side columns. 3 Engine Monte, BLEKKO, 
http://blekko.com/ws/+/monte (last visited Apr. 1, 2013). 
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These low switching costs explain why most users actually 
use more than one search engine, typically a combination of a 
default generalized search engine, other GSEs, and a stable of 
vertical or specialized search engines for particular purposes (e.g., 
travel booking, product review, product purchasing, people 
finding, etc.).  
Shopping Costs: Even if a consumer is buying a new 
computer based on the Windows operating system, there are 
shopping costs involved. However, by our definition, those are not 
switching costs.
83
 Rather, the shopping costs of switching are only 
those additional shopping costs associated with changing from 
Windows-based computer to an alternative (e.g., a Mac or a 
Chromebook). Those additional costs include the costs of finding 
that combination of hardware and software that will replace the 
consumer’s current setup, as well as the costs of finding software 
or other methods of converting files from the current operating 
system and applications to the new. 
If there are any shopping costs to switching among 
alternative, typically free, search engines, they are close to zero. 
Indeed, one important use of search engines is finding other search 
engines, whether in the organic or sponsored results. The Web is 
the ultimate “department store,” with a practically infinite number 
of “departments,” all located conveniently on the user’s computer 
or mobile device, all reachable by many different means.  
 
B. Evidence of Switching Across Generalized Search 
Engines (GSEs) 
As a general proposition, the more often a user searches for 
particular types of information, the more likely the user has 
developed a preference for a special purpose website and goes 
“straight there” through recall, bookmarks, or apps. Thus, not 
surprisingly, the data show that a large share of searching is done 
on special purpose websites, not GSEs (and those data do not 
include “searching” on vendor sites), and that only 4% of users’ 
online time is spent searching.
84
 Also, switching costs among 
                                                 
82




 Nor, by definition, do the shopping costs incurred by a first-time computer 
buyer constitute switching costs. 
84
 State of the Media: The Social Media Report – Q3 2011, NM INCITE 2, 
http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-downloads/2011-
Reports/nielsen-social-media-report.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2013), [hereinafter 
State of the Media]. 
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different types of search engines are not substantially different 
from switching from one GSE to another. Even if there is a 
tremendous volume of searches on GSEs, though, that does not 
necessarily mean that a narrow market definition is correct for 
antitrust purposes. In any case, we will first evaluate switching 
costs among GSEs, and then across the broader range of Internet 
search alternatives available to and used by consumers. Indeed, the 
lower the switching costs across types of search alternatives and 
the greater the observed switching, the stronger the argument for 
defining the relevant market more broadly. 
We note, though, that one should not assume that the 
degree of switching is an indicator of switching costs: whereas a 
high rate of switching almost certainly indicates low switching 
costs, low switching does not necessarily indicate high switching 
costs. According to a report to the United Kingdom’s Office of 
Fair Trade, one should not “focus[] on the rate of switching 
alone,”85 because a relatively low rate of switching may simply 
reflect the fact that consumers' preferences between products are 
stable. This explanation is supported by evidence that consumers 
easily can and readily do switch to alternatives, but then switch 
back to their preferred search engine. 
With those caveats, we turn to empirical evidence of actual 
switching among search engines. Numerous recent studies at 
Microsoft Research
86
 (or authored by Microsoft researchers) have 




A user’s decision to select one search engine over 
another can be based on factors including reputation, 
familiarity, effectiveness, and interface usability. 
Searchers may not use the same engine for all 
queries; they often switch between different engines 
within and between sessions. . . .  
                                                 
85
 Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs., Switching Costs, Part One: Economic Models 
and Policy Implications, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, DEP’T OF TRADE & 
INDUSTRY, UK 3 (Apr. 2003), http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_ 
policy/oft655.pdf. 
86 
Our Research, MICROSOFT RES., http://research.microsoft.com/apps/catalog/ 
default.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2013) (“[E]stablished in 1991, [Microsoft 
Research] has become one of the largest, fastest-growing, most respected 
software research organizations in the world.  Its distinguished researchers and 
scientists help shape the computing experience of millions of people worldwide . 
. . .”). 
87
 Presumably, one of the motivations of these studies is that Microsoft Research 
has an interest in learning about search engine users’ behavior so Microsoft can 
encourage or incentivize users to switch from Google or other search engines to 
Bing.  It is surprising, though, that Microsoft Research has consistently found 
that search switching costs are very low, which is completely at odds with 
Microsoft’s public policy advocacy. 
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Of the 14.2 million users in our log sample, 
10.3 million (72.6%) used more than one engine in 
the six-month duration of the logs, 7.1 million 
(50.0%) switched engines within a search session at 
least once, and 9.6 million (67.6%) used different 
engines for different sessions (i.e., engaged in 
between-session switching). In addition, 0.6 million 
users (4.4%) “defected” from one search engine to 




Note that this Microsoft Research study only counts 
switching between GSEs, during or between “search sessions.” If a 
user switched from a GSE to a VSE (a vertical switch engine such 
as Amazon), that action is treated as an “end” to the search session, 
rather than a “switch” to another search engine. Given the 
extraordinarily large number of vertical search engines—and the 
frequency with which they appear in the native search results—that 
restricted definition of search likely understates the frequency of 
search engine switching to a substantial degree. 
Even with that limitation, Microsoft Research found that 
dissatisfaction with the search results was the primary reason that 
searchers switched engines:  
 
40.4% of subjects reported having defected from one 
search engine to another and never or very rarely 
returning to the pre-switch (origin) engine. 82.7% of 
subjects reported that they were happy with their 
                                                 
88
 Ryen W. White & Susan T. Dumais, Characterizing and Predicting Search 
Engine Switching Behavior, MICROSOFT RES. 1, 3 (2009), 
http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/sdumais/CIKM2009-Switching-
fp1012-white.pdf (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This article is just one of 
many Microsoft Research studies of search behavior and search switching, all 
reaching similar conclusions - namely that switching search engines is easy and 
frequent. See, e.g., Doug Downey, Susan Dumais & Eric Horvitz, Models of 
Searching and Browsing: Languages, Studies, and Applications, MICROSOFT 
RES. (2007), http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/horvitz/search_ 
models_ijcai-07.pdf; Qi Guo et al., Why Searchers Switch: Understanding and 
Predicting Engine Switching Rationales, MICROSOFT RES. (2011), 
http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/sdumais/sigir2011-searchengine 
switching-fp348-guo.pdf; Allison P. Heath & Ryen W. White, Defection 
Detection: Predicting Search Engine Switching, MICROSOFT RES. (2008), http:// 
research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/ryenw/papers/heathwww2008.pdf; 
Ryen W. White, Ashish Kappor & Susan T. Dumais, Modeling Long-Term 
Search Engine Usage, MICROSOFT RES. (2010), http://research.microsoft.com/ 
en-us/um/people/ryenw/papers/whiteumap2010.pdf; Ryen W. White et al., 
Enhancing Web Search by Promoting Multiple Search Engine Use, MICROSOFT 
RES. (2008), http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/ryenw/papers/white 
sigir2008a.pdf. 
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decision to defect . . . . The main reasons for 
defection were many dissatisfactory experiences with 
the origin engine (43.9%), one particularly 
dissatisfactory experience with the origin engine 
(7.9%), more relevant results on other engine 
(20.1%), or a new entry point such as a browser 




The Microsoft researchers concluded that: 
  
The reasons for switching are varied and include: 
perceived poor quality of results on original engine, 
desire for verification or additional coverage, and 
user preferences. Approximately half of all users in 
our log sample and around two-thirds of survey 
respondents engage in within-session switching. It is 
clear that the utilization of multiple search engines is 
an important aspect of users’ Web search behavior. 
Since switching is mainly associated with 
dissatisfaction with the search results on the origin 
engine, that engine could tailor the search experience 




These Microsoft Research results are reinforced by a recent 
study by Slingshot SEO, which highlighted the difference in the 
effectiveness of search results between Bing and Google, largely 
explaining users’ preference for the latter over the former. The 
Slingshot SEO study found that Bing’s click through rate for the 
first result on a search result page was only half that of Google’s 
(9.66% vs. 18.20%); Bing also had lower click-through rates on its 
top 10 search results.
91 
 This marked difference in click-through 
rates between Google and Bing indicates that Google is returning 
search results that better meet users’ needs and could explain the 
preference of Google users over Bing. Because users differ in their 




                                                 
89
 White & Dumais, Characterizing and Predicting Search Engine Switching 
Behavior, supra note 88,. at 4.  
90
 Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
91
 Casey Szulc, A Tale of Two Studies: Google vs. Bing CTR, DIGITAL 
RELEVANCE (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.relevance.com/blog/a-tale-of-two-
studies-google-vs-bing-ctr. Digital Relevance also found that users clicked-
through to Google’s top organic results at roughly double the rate of Bing search 
results: second result, 10.05% v. 5.51%; third result, 7.22% v. 2.74%; fourth 
result, 4.81% v. 1.88%. 
92
 According to “an independent study commissioned by Microsoft Corp . . . . 
people chose Bing Web search results over Google nearly 2-to-1 in blind 
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Slingshot SEO also noted the ease with which users can 
switch from one search engine to the other – by entering the name 
of the other search engine into the search bar of the origin search 
engine: 
 
Every month, roughly 117 million searches are made 
for “google” in Bing. It’s hard to fathom why one 
would search for a search engine while using a search 
engine, but let’s face it, users are aware that Bing and 
Google provide very different results. To put this 
number in perspective, consider the fact that, on 
average by month, only 55 million searches are made 
for “google” in Google and 4 million searches are 
made for “bing” in Google.93  
 
This is but one example of a broader phenomenon: the use of a 
GSE not for searching, but as a “navigational aid.” Evidently, 
many users find the easiest way to get to Facebook is by entering 
“f” in the search bar (both Bing’s and Google’s respective 
autocomplete functions list “Facebook” as the first entry when “f” 
is entered), allowing the user to click on “Facebook” to go to 
Facebook. This probably explains why “Facebook” was the 
number one search entry on search engines in 2011. In fact, all of 
the top 10 search terms in 2011 and 2010 were navigational in 
nature, which included terms like “ebay,” “youtube” and 
“craigslist.”94 In addition, comScore notes a similar trend in 
navigational searches: “About 12.5 billion searches were 
performed in July on the Big 5 search engines (Google, Yahoo, 
Bing, Ask, AOL Search) in the United States. Of those, 
approximately 1.9 billion were navigational in nature, or more than 
15 percent of all searches in a given month.”95 
The use of a search engine to easily navigate to other sites 
all but eliminates the costs of switching to an alternative GSE, 
VSE, or other site. When users enter “a” into the GSE’s search bar, 
they are often navigating to “Amazon” to search for products, 
product reviews, and the like, the same as with many other sites to 
which users navigate by use of a GSE search bar. Arguably, 
                                                                                                             
comparison tests.” Chris Crum, Bing Says Most People Prefer Bing to Google, 
WEBPRONEWS (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.webpronews.com/bing-says-most-
people-prefer-bing-to-google-2012-09. 
93
 Szulc, supra note 92. 
94
 Facebook was the top search term for third straight year, EXPERIAN, 
http://www.experian.com/hitwise/press-release-facebook-was-the-top-search-
term-for-2011.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).  
95
 Eli Goodman, Navigational Search: Turn Right at the Big Chicken, SEARCH 
ENGINE WATCH (Sept. 13, 2010), http://searchenginewatch.com/article/ 
2067933/Navigational-Search-Turn-Right-at-the-Big-Chicken. 
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counting these as “searches” overstates the frequency of searches 
on GSEs and understates the ease of switching from a GSE to other 
search methods or navigating directly to other sites. 
These Microsoft Research and Slingshot SEO findings are 
consistent with the findings of other studies,
96
 which have also 
found that low training investment, low customization investment, 
ability to experiment with other search engines, and the 
obviousness of better results means that switching costs are low 
among GSEs.
97
 This research is quite revealing of user preference 
and search relevance as being the driving factor behind users’ 
willingness to switch search engines.  
Overall, these findings are significant on two counts: they 
demonstrate that users do switch among search engines and they 
explain why users switch: “switching is mainly associated with 
dissatisfaction with the search results on the origin engine.”98 
These facts are critical for success in competing for search engine 
users: the better the results, the less likely users are to switch away. 
But conversely, if search results are degraded—for whatever 
reasons—users are more likely to switch to an alternative. In 
extreme cases, users defect: they switch search engines and do not 
switch back. If users defect from a search engine—or use it less—
that would translate directly into fewer advertising revenues and 
lower profits: strong reasons not to degrade the quality of search 
results.  Therefore, the argument that Google would bias its search 
results in a manner that would degrade users’ experience makes no 
economic sense, because users could and would switch some of 
their searching usage to other search engines, causing a loss of 
click-through advertising revenue to Google. 
  
C. Alternatives to Generalized Search Engines for 
Searching 
Market share data for search often assumes a “narrow” 
market definition for search, one that includes only GSEs, such as 
Google, Bing, Yahoo, and Ask. However, when consumers are 
searching for information on the Internet, from a computer or 
mobile device, they have a rapidly growing number of and 
improving quality of alternatives to GSEs. So, the first choice 
                                                 
96
 For example, a survey found that “62% of [r]espondents [w]ould [b]e 
[w]illing to [c]onsider [s]witching [s]earch [e]ngines.” IMRAN KHAN ET AL., 
NOTHING BUT NET: 2009 INTERNET INVESTMENT GUIDE 21 (2009). 
97
 E.g., Dharmesh Shah, Why It Will Be So Easy to Switch Away from Google 
Search, ONSTARTUPS (Dec. 4, 2006), http://onstartups.com/tabid/3339/bid/64/ 
Why-It-Will-Be-So-Easy-To-Switch-Away-From-Google-Search.aspx. 
98
 White & Dumais, Characterizing and Predicting Search Engine Switching 
Behavior, supra note 88, at 9. 
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consumers typically make is where and how to search for 
information, and that choice typically involves a host of 
alternatives, including vertical search engines (VSEs) such as 
BizNar, Technorati, or KellyBlueBook. There are also a growing 
number of special purpose sites (SPS) that offer specialized search 
capabilities, including content sites (NYTimes, CNET), content 
aggregators (Pulse, FlipBoard, Huffington Post), comparison 
shopping sites (BizRate, NexTag), multiple-vendor retailing sites 
(Amazon, eBay), price comparison sites (Kayak), booking sites 
(OpenTable, Expedia), and product vendors (United.com, 
Ford.com). There is a growing use of social networks to search for 
information (e.g., which movies do my Facebook friends “like”). It 
is also apparent that search engines face growing competition from 
mobile apps and “search intermediaries,” such as Apple’s Siri.  
Moreover, the costs of switching among these alternatives 
are low or even zero. So, not surprisingly, there is abundant 
evidence that a growing amount of “search” is being done on 
vertical search engines, or on websites or apps that are not 
typically considered search engines—even though they compete 
directly for users who are looking for information on the Internet. 
Let us consider some of that evidence. 
 
1. Evidence on Switching Between Vertical Search 
and Generalized Search 
As previously noted, the ability of consumers to use a 
combination of general and vertical search engines to find 
information is not hindered by switching or “multi-homing” costs. 
Hotchkiss found similar results in an online survey of 400 
consumers’ search engine usage. 99 When it came to searching for 
more specific results, he found that 80% of those surveyed  
 
[W]ould use a well known non search site to help 
narrow down their choices. For travel related 
searches, these would typically be a travel portal such 
as Expedia.com or Travelocity.com. For home 
electronics, it could be a well-known retailer, such as 
Circuit City. We also found E-bay and Amazon used 




Other researchers have also noted that Internet users often 
turn to vertical sites.  For example, as the number of products and 
                                                 
99
  Gord Hotchkiss et al., Into the Mind of the Searcher, ENQUIRO SEARCH 
SOLUTIONS (2004), http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.sempo.org/resource/resmgr/ 
Docs/searcher-mind.pdf. 
100
 Id. at 19. 
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product reviews has increased on Amazon, Amazon competes 
directly with Google for product searches: 
 
“Google and Amazon both have the same end goal, 
to be the destination that people go to to do their 
product searches, and Amazon's winning that battle,” 
said Michael Griffin, founder and chief technology 





Horizontal search engines sometimes provide too much 
“noise” in cases where users are specifically looking for shopping, 
travel, or other “vertical” fields. Vertical search engines can 
provide more focused results depending on the intent of the 
searcher. Not surprisingly, therefore, vertical searches are a 
significant portion of total online searches, serving a third of all 
search volume, as shown in the following graph.
102
 In response to 
vertical search engines, generalized search engines such as Bing 
and Google are attempting to improve their performance by 




One of the reasons VSEs are competitive with GSEs is that 
switching costs are so low across vertical search engines and 
between vertical and generalized search. Unlike an operating 
system—where most users have one and only one—Internet users 
                                                 
101
 Claire Cain Miller, Google Struggles to Unseat Amazon as the Web’s Most 
Popular Mall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/10/ 
technology/google-shopping-competition-amazon-charging-retailers.html. 
102
 Does Search Still Matter?, WHERE2GETIT (Oct. 4, 2011), http://blog.where2 
getit.com/2011/10/does-search-still-matter/. 
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can easily have a “stable” of vertical search engines (and other 
means of searching the Internet) with zero marginal costs. 
Moreover, in the virtual world, “shopping costs” are essentially 
zero. Recall from Section B that the reduction of shopping costs 
explains both department stores and supermarkets on the one hand, 
and closely situated specialty stores on the other. Consider one 
block on College Avenue in Berkeley, for example, with an 
independent wine and cheese shop, a fresh fruits and vegetables 
market, a meat and seafood market, a bakery-patisserie, and a 
pharmacy. Directly across the street is a Safeway, offering all of 
those products and a good deal more.  
In these brick-and-mortar examples, the specialty stores are 
analogous to vertical search (one can only search within a given 
category, such as autos) and the supermarket to generalized search 
(one can search across many categories).
103
  But while those 
independent stores have reduced shopping costs as much as 
possible by locating so closely together, there are still significant 
shopping costs and transactions costs (e.g., waiting in line for 
service and/or to check out at each store visited). Contrast the 
brick-and-mortar case to the virtual world of vertical search: a user 
can easily set up bookmarks for a host of vertical sites such as 
product review and purchasing (Amazon or eBay), travel reviews 
(TripAdvisor), travel price comparisons and/or booking (Priceline, 
Kayak, Expedia), news (New York Times, Flipboard, Pulse), and 
as many more as the user chooses. The cost of identifying these 
sites is near zero, as is the costs of switching from one to another. 
Indeed, one of the primary benefits of generalized search engines 
is that, each time a GSE takes a user to a VSE that the user finds 
particularly well-suited to her preferences, the user can bookmark 
that site (and/or sign up for email alerts or RSS feeds), which 
makes it costless for the user to return directly to the site without 
using the GSE as an intermediary. The same logic also applies to 
apps, which explains why many customers have a stable of apps to 
easily and costlessly navigate to a wide range of specialized sites 
or information without the use of a GSE. 
2. Evidence on Switching Between GSEs and Mobile 
Apps 
The recent boom in mobile device use has not only led to 
an increase in internet usage with the ubiquitous nature of data 
                                                 
103
 Note, though, the advantage that some VSEs have over GSEs: the user can 
search for information and take further actions.  For example, one can search 
Google or Bing for product reviews, then go to another site to make a purchase.  
One can search for product reviews, compare prices, and actually make a 
purchase on Amazon. 
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plans, but has also led to a shift in consumer focus from traditional 
browser and webpage-based Internet services to mobile 
applications. These applications, especially with the introduction 
of the iPhone, Android devices, and other smartphones, have 
become a significant source of business for web developers. 
Services such as local business reviews, weather forecasts, and 
social networks are increasingly served through mobile 
applications. With over 830,000 applications in the iTunes App 
Store
104
 and over 660,000 applications in the Android Market,
105
 it 
is not surprising that applications are now competing with 
traditional web pages. 
In fact, as of June 2011, the amount of time spent with 
mobile apps per person per day reached 81 minutes, compared to 
74 minutes on the web. This represented an 88% increase in time 
spent with apps as compared to June 2010. In December 2011, the 
amount of time spent with mobile apps per person per day 
increased again to 94 minutes, with the amount of time spent on 






This is an especially important trend: not only are 
consumers switching away from the traditional Web consisting of 
websites and webpages, but they are finding that applications such 
as those designed by Facebook or Yelp are providing more 
directed and focused portals of information. Searching horizontally 
                                                 
104
 App Store Metrics, 148APPS.BIZ, http://148apps.biz/app-store-metrics/ (last 
updated June 1, 2013, 11:07 PM). 
105
 Number of available Android applications, APPBRAIN, 
http://www.appbrain.com/stats/number-of-android-apps (last updated Apr. 3, 
2013). 
106
 Charles Newark-French, Mobile App Usage Further Dominates Web, 
Spurred by Facebook, FLURRY BLOG (Jan. 9, 2012), http://blog.flurry.com/ 
bid/80241/Mobile-App-Usage-Further-Dominates-Web-Spurred-by-Facebook. 
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is no longer a necessary precursor to finding specific information 
on the Internet. 
24/7 Wall St. researched the most popular categories U.S. 
users search for on Google, and then compared them to the Apple 
Store’s most popular apps (i.e. those that produced comparable or 
superior results to Google). They found that search categories like 
retail, lyrics, navigation, email, games, video, news, reference, and 
weather all had free apps for Apple devices that could skip a search 
on a search engine entirely.
107
  
Not surprisingly, industry analysts have highlighted the 
growing competition between Web search engines and mobile 
apps, and the ease with which users can switch between the 
methods of finding information and answers to questions:  
 
Behold the biggest threat to mobile search -- apps . . . 
It’s much easier to interact with content through an 
app than through Web pages. And it’s much easier to 





[A]s we shift our usage to the mobile web . . . we’re 
using apps. On their face, these apps don’t seem like 
search at all. Except they are . . . For nearly every 
structured set of results, there’ll be an app for that, if 
there isn’t already.109 
 
Our mobile app accounted for approximately 40% of 
all searches on our [Yelp!] platform for the quarter 




Moreover, most of these platforms are creating applications 
program interfaces to enable and encourage independent apps 
developers to expand the capabilities of their respective 
platform.
111
  Given the growing number of platforms that provide 
                                                 
107
 See How Apple Killed the Future of Search, 24/7 WALL ST. (Apr. 8, 2010), 
http://247wallst.com/2010/04/08/how-apple-killed-the-future-of-search/. 
108
 Aaron Goldman, Mobile Matters: 15 Mobile Search Stats That Ring True, 
MEDIAPOST BLOGS (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/ 
article/160766/mobile-matters-15-mobile-search-stats-that-ring-t.html. 
109
 John Battelle, The Evolving Search Interface: Mobile Drives Search as App, 
SEARCHBLOG (Jan. 15, 2010), http://battellemedia.com/archives/2010/01/ 
the_evolving_search_interface_mobile_drives_search_as_app.php. 
110
 Yelp! Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-
1) 75 (Nov. 17, 2011). 
111
 Jan Bosch, From Software Product Lines to Software Ecosystems, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH INTERNATIONAL SOFTWARE PRODUCT LINE 
CONFERENCE (2009).  
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APIs and the resulting explosive growth in the number of apps for 
Apple, Android, Microsoft, Facebook, Twitter, and other 
platforms, it is evident that the competition between apps and 
search engines will continue to increase.  Arguably, the relevant 
market for search should include those apps which incorporate 
significant search capabilities. 
 
3. Evidence on Switching Between Social Media 
Search and Generalized Search 
A recent comprehensive report by Outbrain found that 
social networks are becoming a significant referral source for 
content pages: “While search still reigns supreme in terms of 
directing traffic to content pages (41% of external referrers), social 
is gaining share at 11%.”112 This view of the growing importance 
of social media for search is shared by a number of observers: 
 
As people spend more time on Social Media 
sites, it would be logical to assume that they would 
do more Search activity on these sites. Use of portal 
sites and direct entry (to Websites) appear to have 
declined as a means to Search for content . . . as 
Facebook increasingly socializes content and 
commerce, we would expect people to find rich 




In [Google’s] web, everything starts with a 
search . . . . But in recent years the web has tilted 
gradually, and perhaps inexorably, toward 
[Facebook’s] world. There, rather than search for a 
news article, you wait for your friends to tell you 
what to read. They tell you what movies they 





                                                 
112
 Kelly Reeves, Study Gives Insight Into Content Discovery Trends Across the 
Web’s Leading Publishers, OUTBRAIN (Apr. 14, 2011), 
http://www.outbrain.com/blog/2011/04/outbrain-content-discovery-report.html. 
113
 Mark Gongloff, Facebook Sucks Up a Ridiculously Huge and Growing Share 
of Our Time Wasted Online, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
marketbeat/2011/09/26/facebook-sucks-up-a-ridiculously-huge-and-growing-
share-of-our-time-wasted-online/ (quoting Mark Mahaney, former Citigroup 
Interwebs analyst). 
114
 Miguel Helft & Jessi Hempel, Facebook vs. Google: The Battle for the 
Future of the Web, CNN MONEY (Nov. 29, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/ 
11/03/technology/facebook_google_fight.fortune/index.htm. 
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Social networks and blogs consume almost a quarter of 
U.S. users’ time online. In comparison, only 4% of U.S. users’ 




[G]rowth in search advertising is slowing, and 
advertisers are putting more of their limited dollars 
into Facebook, with its 800 million users, many of 





Advertising revenues at Twitter grew 213% to 
$139.5 million in 2011—the company’s second full 
year of selling advertising—and strong international 
growth is expected to push the company’s ad 
revenues to $259.9 million in 2012. . . . By 2014, 
eMarketer estimates, global ad revenues at Twitter 




4. Evidence on Arrival Rates at Websites Directly 
or Indirectly, Not From a GSE 
 
Whereas a user cannot operate a personal computer without 
an operating system, one can search and find information on the 
Internet without using a GSE. Most important of these is by 
entering the URL of favorite sites (or clicking on bookmarked 
favorites). Outbrain found that 67% of all “arrivals” to websites 
were direct to the site (i.e. the user entered the URL or clicked on a 
bookmark or email link) or from the site itself (i.e. the user clicked 
on a link on the site to bring up another page on the same site); 
10% of arrivals were from other content-based Websites; and 6% 
were from Web portals. Arrivals from generalized search engines 




5. Evidence on Competition Between Emerging 
Technologies and Generalized Search  
 
In addition to the rapid growth in vertical search, newly 
emerging technologies are beginning to have a significant impact 
on the means and methods used to search for information or find 
                                                 
115
 State of the Media, supra note 84.  
116
 Helft & Hempel, supra note 115, at 46.  
117
 After Strong 2011, Twitter Ad Revenues to Grow 86% to $259 Million in 




 Reeves, supra note 113. 
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answers to questions on the Internet. Due to rapid technological 
change—for example, enormous strides in voice recognition and 
artificial intelligence—technological advances will increase 
alternatives to traditional search and further reduce switching costs 
among those alternatives. Perhaps the prototypical example of 
these developments is Siri, which is fast becoming a direct 
competition to GSEs, as noted by industry analysts: 
 
No longer is the search box the front-end of 
searches on the iPhone 4S. Google is the back-end 
technology that is suddenly less visible. Or rather, 
one of the back ends. Because of the rise of 
specialized searches like Yelp and Wolfram|Alpha, 
Siri can easily bypass Google's search algorithms for 
many queries.119 
 
Siri could seriously reduce how much we use 
Google’s services and revenue in the long run. Siri is 




There’s an obvious reason Apple would sit on 
[Google’s new natural speech-to-text search] app. It 
competes with Siri. Siri goes out of its way to avoid 
searching Google . . . . Apple wants users to be in the 




Siri and other similar “personal assistant” applications have 
the potential to bypass generalized search engines entirely.
122
 By 
inputting a verbal request for facts, location information, or 
commands, search engines are relegated to the background, 
providing only as much information as is requested by the user. 
This trend in mobile and desktop automation will bypass 
traditional search engines and reduce the role of conventional 
search advertising. Although search will not become obsolete any 
time soon, the prominence of services like Siri will reduce its role 
in delivering user requested information. 
                                                 
119








 Jon Mitchell, Another Way Apple’s Fight with Google is Hurting Users, 
READWRITEWEB (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/ 
another-way-apples-fight-with-google-is-hurting-users.php. 
122
 Siri and other personal assistants can also obtain information from, or direct 
users to, vertical search sites such as OpenTable and Yelp. 
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Given the extraordinary rate of technological advancement 
in computing, artificial intelligence, software, applications 
development, cloud computing services, and communications 
devices, it is a near certainty that Siri is just the first of many 
fundamentally different approaches to searching and finding 
information on the Internet. And, because the Web is an open 
platform, with industry standards and high degree of compatibility, 
it is also a near certainty that the costs of switching among these 
alternatives will be extremely low. This, then, is the fundamental 
difference between the Windows operating system and Google 
Search on the Internet.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
Any monopolization case against Google Search would 
have to be very different from the Microsoft browser case, because 
the cost for a user switching from Google Search is much lower 
than was the cost in the 1990s (or today) of switching away from 
the Microsoft operating system. It would likewise need to be 
different because Google has not attempted to manipulate the cost 
of a user switching away from Google Search, at least not to a 
significant degree.  Low switching costs should and likely will 
have important implications for antitrust analysis of Google.  
First, just as high switching costs helped to narrow the 
market in the Microsoft case, a relative absence of switching costs 
provides a good reason to include vertical search engines in an 
antitrust market. No single vertical search engine or even all of 
them combined are a perfect substitute for a universal search 
engine, but they do not need to be to provide meaningful 
competition. Low switching costs mean that users can switch 
among a portfolio of vertical search engines, or other search 
applications when convenient, and also use Google, Bing,  Yahoo, 
or other GSEs when they are most convenient. 
Second, regardless of the market definition, low switching 
costs give Google a strong argument that it does not have market 
power even if the market is restricted to generalized search 
engines. Market power typically means the ability to profitably 
charge more than a competitive price for the goods in a market. 
Search is given to searchers for free, which is likely the 
competitive price. Money is made from advertisers. Despite 
Google's current popularity, it is doubtful that Google has market 
power with respect to search users, if market power is understood 
in its traditional sense as the ability to raise prices above 
competitive levels. After all, if Google began to charge users even 
a minimal price to search on its site, let alone a significant price, it 
would surely lose a substantial share of its users to Bing, Yahoo, or 
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other services. Why should anyone pay, let alone register a credit 
card, to enter a search term when other roughly comparable 
services are free, even if many users apparently have a preference 
for Google Search at today's free price? Many, probably most, 
would not. Consider not just the hassle of paying for search but the 
fact that users have come to expect basic Internet services to be 
free.  
Another way that low switching costs could make it 
difficult to prove market power is that they take away an entry 
barrier in the sense that a better product should be able to gain 
market share very quickly, just as Google once did. Some courts, 
like the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft, hold that proving monopoly 
power requires showing both a high market share and also the 
presence of barriers to entry.  
A final and overarching implication of low switching costs 
is that Google must continue to innovate and stay ahead of other 
search engines if it hopes to maintain its position as the most often-
used general search engine. Google would be vulnerable to any 
competitor that is able to present users with more relevant and 
desirable search results, because the cost for users of switching to 
that provider is so low. Some may argue that Google is a 
monopoly today (though we argue above that it does not have 
monopoly power over users), but even if it is, Google is not 
protected from competition by high user switching costs as 
Microsoft has been.  If users prefer to use Siri to search by voice or 
Bing to search by typing, they are free today to switch over 
entirely from Google, or to mix and match. 
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